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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer welfare is the common concern of the antitrust laws, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), the
Texas Insurance Code (TIC), and various other statutes prohibiting
fraudulent conduct in dealing with consumers.1 Antitrust laws, however,
primarily address the misuse of market power to harm consumers, while
anti-deception statutes focus on consumer harm brought about through
* B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., Hastings College of the Law; Partner, Pulman,
Cappuccio, & Pullen, LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas A&M University School of Law; Associ-
ate, Pulman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
1. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41. Section 17.50 of the DTPA provides:
“A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing
cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish:
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive act or
practice that is:
(A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsection (b) of Section 17.46 of
this subchapter; and
(B) relied on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment;
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of Chapter
541, Insurance Code.”
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a).
3
4 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
deception and a litany of other unlawful practices.2 The antitrust laws and
the anti-fraud statutory schemes therefore are best viewed as focusing on
complementary aspects of consumer welfare.
This article covers significant developments under federal and Texas
antitrust laws and consumer protection laws (including the DTPA and its
various tie-ins like the Texas Insurance Code)3 during the Survey period,
December 1, 2017, through November 31, 2018.
II. ANTITRUST
As in prior years, it was difficult to be an antitrust plaintiff during the
Survey period. Many plaintiffs alleging antitrust claims during the Survey
period found themselves unable to get past the motion to dismiss stage;
only one survived summary judgment, and one set of plaintiffs had their
victory taken away by the appellate courts notwithstanding winning a
seven-week bench trial.
A. PLEADING-STAGE DECISIONS
SureShot Golf Ventures and Topgolf are competitors in the golf en-
tertainment center market.4 SureShot had a multi-year contract for golf
ball tracking technology with Protracer when Topgolf bought Protracer.5
SureShot sued, expressing concern that Topgolf would not renew
SureShot’s license for the tracking technology when SureShot’s current
contract expired.6 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas dismissed the claims with prejudice, holding that the claims were
not ripe and that SureShot had failed to plead antitrust injury.7 On ap-
peal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the
claims as pled were not ripe because SureShot was complaining about
hypothetical harm in the future.8 However, the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court’s decision to reach the question of antitrust injury and dis-
miss with prejudice was improper, so the Fifth Circuit modified the judg-
ment to a dismissal without prejudice.9
In Montoya v. San Angelo Community Medical Center, the plaintiff-
doctor alleged that patients in the hospital emergency room needing the
care of a nephrologist were being referred only to a hospital-affiliated
2. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v.
Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.44(a).
3. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151 (“A person who sustains actual damages
may bring an action against another person for those damages caused by the other person
engaging in an act or practice . . . specifically enumerated in [the DTPA] as an unlawful
deceptive trade practice[.]”).
4. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., 754 F. App’x 235, 236–37 (5th
Cir. 2018).
5. Id. at 237.
6. Id. at 237–38.
7. Id. at 238.
8. Id. at 240–41.
9. Id. at 241.
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physician group with which he competed and that this practice was an
unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act of 1983 (TFEAA).10 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed
dismissal of the claim under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91(a) on the
ground that the plaintiff had only alleged injury to his own economic in-
terests and thus had failed to allege facts demonstrating antitrust injury.11
In Mary Kay Inc. v. Reibel, Gerald Reibel was sued by cosmetics manu-
facturer Mary Kay for allegedly selling expired Mary Kay products on
eBay without authorization.12 Reibel counterclaimed for attempted mo-
nopolization under federal law and unfair competition under state law,
alleging that Mark Kay was improperly using litigation against small ven-
dors.13 Mary Kay moved to dismiss on the grounds that Reibel had failed
to plead antitrust injury.14 The U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas agreed, explaining that “the antitrust laws are not intended
to prevent a manufacturer’s ‘monopoly over the distribution of its own
products.’”15 The district court granted the motion to dismiss because
Reibel failed to allege antitrust injury in that he “failed to allege an injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”16 The district
court alternatively granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that
Reibel failed to allege the necessary elements of his antitrust claims.17
Mary Kary argued that (1) Reibel failed to define the product and geo-
graphic markets; (2) failed to identify any actions by Mary Kay that could
be deemed predatory or exclusionary; (3) failed to plausibly allege that
Mary Kay had a specific intent to monopolize; and (4) failed to plausibly
allege that Mary Kay had a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power.18 The district court held that Reibel did not specifically respond to
any of these arguments and that Reibel’s failure to adequately plead spe-
cific intent to monopolize or the dangerous probability of obtaining mo-
nopoly power were fatal to Reibel’s claims.19
In Batra v. Covenant Health System,20 a doctor whose credentials to
practice at Covenant Health Systems’s facilities were not renewed, result-
ing in a report to the National Practitioner Data Bank, brought suit com-
plaining, among other things, that Covenant’s actions constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade under TFEAA.21 Covenant moved to dis-
10. Montoya v. San Angelo Cmty. Medical Ctr., No. 03–16–00510–CV, 2018 WL
2437508, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 31, 2018, pet. denied).
11. Id. at *5–7.
12. Mary Kay Inc. v. Reibel, No. 3:17-CV-2634-D, 2018 WL 2984865, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Jun. 14, 2018) (mem. op.).
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. at *2–3.
15. Id. at *4 (quoting Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480,
488 (5th Cir. 1984)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *5.
19. Id.
20. 562 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. filed).
21. Id. at 704.
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miss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act.22 The Amarillo Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion, holding,
with regard to the plaintiff’s TFEAA claim, that the plaintiff failed to
present clear and specific evidence of an adverse effect on competition as
a whole.23
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)24 limits the
application of U.S. antitrust laws in cases involving foreign commerce,
excluding coverage when only foreign injury is alleged unless the com-
plained-of conduct “has a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect’ on United States imports, domestic commerce, or United States
exporters.”25 Leaf Trading Cards, LLC v. The Upper Deck Company in-
volved a dispute between two manufacturers of hockey trading cards.
Leaf Trading Cards (Leaf) accused The Upper Deck Company (Upper
Deck) of using its “dominant market position” to foreclose competition
in U.S. and Canadian markets for hockey trading cards.26 Upper Deck
argued that the FTAIA barred Leaf’s allegations regarding the Canadian
market.27 Leaf’s contention was that Upper Deck’s actions in excluding
Leaf from the bigger Canadian market, had the direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect of Leaf being unable to achieve efficiencies
necessary to compete in the American market.28 Previously, in Coors
Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co.,29 the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado held that a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct in Ca-
nada could satisfy the FTAIA in an integrated market.30 Applying Coors
to the dispute before it, and accepting Leaf’s allegations as true, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that
the North American hockey trading card market, like the National
Hockey League whose players were depicted on the cards, was suffi-
ciently integrated to render the harm alleged by Leaf in the United States
a foreseeable effect of Upper Deck’s alleged actions in Canada sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss.31
Louisiana law governing court reporters provides that an employee or
attorney of a litigant may not act as a court reporter.32 It defines “em-
ployee” to include “a person who has a contractual relationship with a
22. Id.
23. Id. at 711–12; see also Location Servs., LLC v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc.,
No. 4:18-CV-744-A, 2018 WL 5787317, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2018) (mem. op.) (dis-
missing antitrust claims for failure to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate antitrust injury,
power to exclude competition, or existence of a conspiracy).
24. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
25. Leaf Trading Cards, LLC v. The Upper Deck Co., No. 3:17-CV-03200-N, 2018 WL
2971135, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2018) (mem. op.) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)).
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id.
29. 889 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Colo. 1995) (mem. op.).
30. Id. at 1398.
31. Leaf Trading Cards, 2018 WL 2971135, at *3.
32. Veritext Corp. v. Bonin, 901 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2018).
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party litigant to provide shorthand reporting.”33 This law is enforced by
the Louisiana Board of Examiners of Certified Shorthand Reporters (the
Board).34 Starting in 2012, the Board began enforcing this provision
against court reporters who had volume-based discount agreements and
related concessions with their frequent customers.35
A national court reporting service, Veritext, sued alleging, among other
things, that the Board’s actions violated the antitrust laws because the
Board was acting to prevent competition from national and regional
court reporting firms in order to increase business opportunities for local,
freelance court reporters.36 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the antitrust
claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.37
Veritext pled that the Board was comprised of market participants who
acted to deter and delay the entry of large court reporting firms into the
market.38 The court held that these allegations were sufficient to support
a finding that the Board’s conduct restrains trade.39 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the Board’s contention that its actions were immune. While Parker
immunity provides immunity from federal antitrust laws for conduct by a
state, this immunity applies only where (1) the challenged restraint is
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and (2)
the policy is “actively supervised by the State.”40 The Fifth Circuit held
that the Board satisfied the first requirement, but not the second, which
requires that the state at least review the substance of any anticompeti-
tive decisions.41
The Fifth Circuit explained that Veritext’s pleading set forth sufficient
facts to support a finding of the absence of active supervision because
“nothing in the record indicate[d]”42 that any elected or appointed state
officials oversaw the Board’s actions.43 The court rejected the Board’s
argument that active supervision could be found in the legislature’s abil-
ity to amend the law or veto proposed rules under the Louisiana Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, holding that “the ‘mere potential for state
supervision’” is insufficient to constitute active supervision.44 The Fifth





37. Id. at 291.
38. Id. at 292.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015)).
41. Id.
42. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion correctly reflects that the court was reviewing an order
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim but recites the standard of review
for summary judgment, refers several times to “the record,” and concludes by stating that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Id. at 291–93.
43. Id. at 292.
44. Id. at 292–93 (quoting N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116).
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ficiently pled that Board members were active market participants and
(2) the Board does not advance private interests simply by enforcing state
law.45 Louisiana law provides that six of the nine Board members be cer-
tified shorthand reporters, which the court found sufficient to qualify
them as active market participants.46 The court further held that “it
strains credulity to regard the Board’s conduct as strictly public minded,”
given that the record reflected that the Board had convened a meeting
that included “‘How to increase rates?’” as an agenda item.47 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that Veritext had pled sufficient facts to support a find-
ing of active supervision by the state.48
B. RELEVANT MARKET
American Express (Amex) requires the merchants with which it con-
tracts to agree to an antisteering provision under which the merchants
must agree not to “steer” customers from using American Express cards
to using other credit cards.49 In Ohio v. American Express Co.,50 the
United States and several states sued Amex, alleging that the antisteering
provision violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York held a seven-week bench trial and
ruled against Amex, holding (1) that the credit card market should be
treated as a market for merchants and a separate market for cardholders
and (2) that the antisteering provisions have an anticompetitive effect in
the merchant market.51 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding (1) that the credit card market was a single market and
(2) that viewing the market as a whole, Amex’s antisteering provision was
not anticompetitive.52
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed,
holding in a 5–4 decision that the United States had failed to meet its
burden to prove that the antisteering provisions were anticompetitive.53
The Supreme Court first explained that the credit card market was a two-
sided transaction platform in that credit card companies brought two par-
ties together and offered different services to each side.54 Specifically, the
credit card companies offer credit to the cardholders and processing ser-
vices and quick payment to the merchants.55 The Court engaged in a
lengthy discussion, supported by citation to numerous academic journal
articles, of the ways in which two-sided transaction platforms are differ-





49. Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277 (2018).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2283.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2283, 2287.
54. Id. at 2280–81.
55. Id. at 2280.
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quire a different analysis for antitrust purposes.56 Specifically, two-sided
platforms “cannot raise prices on one side without risking a feedback
loop of declining demand . . . [a]nd the fact that two-sided platforms
charge one side a price that is below or above cost reflects differences in
the two sides’ demand elasticity, not market power or anticompetitive
pricing.”57 Likewise, a price increase on one side of the platform is not
evidence of anticompetitive effects if it has not “increased the overall cost
of the platform’s services.”58 The Court concluded that a two-sided trans-
action market should be analyzed as a single market for antitrust
purposes.59
Turning to the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had
not carried their burden to show anticompetitive effects in the relevant
market.60 The plaintiffs had proven only that Amex’s agreements in-
creased merchant fees and had not shown anticompetitive effects in the
market as a whole—such as an increased cost of credit-card transactions,
reduced number of credit-card transactions, or other harm to competition
in the credit-card market.61
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the dissent, described the anticom-
petitive effects on the merchant side of the transaction found by the dis-
trict court after the bench trial.62 The dissent then challenged the
majority’s decision to combine the two sides of the credit card transaction
into a single market, stating that there was no support for doing so in
either antitrust caselaw or in the academic articles the majority relied
upon.63 The dissent also accused the majority of incorrectly discounting
the evidence the plaintiffs offered reflecting an increase in the price
Amex charged merchants.64
Viva Cinemas Theaters and Entertainment, LLC v. AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc.65 arose from complaints about agreements between a
movie theater and motion picture studios, known as movie clearances.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held
that absent evidence of horizontal agreements between movie producers,
claims arising from movie clearances must be analyzed under the rule of
reason, which requires analysis of anti-competitive effects in a relevant
product and geographic market.66 AMC moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Viva lacked sufficient evidence to define the relevant mar-
ket.67 The court held that while an expert’s opinion regarding a geo-
56. Id. at 2280–81, 2285–87.
57. Id. at 2285–86.
58. Id. at 2286.
59. Id. at 2286–87.
60. Id. at 2287.
61. Id. at 2287–90.
62. Id. at 2293–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2297–2301.
64. Id. at 2296, 2301–02.
65. No. 4:15-CV-1015, 2018 WL 4895841 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2018).
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id.
10 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
graphic market cannot be based solely on the plaintiff’s data, a
geographic market opinion is not legally insufficient simply because the
expert’s opinion is based on practical indicia, such as the defendant com-
petitor’s data reflecting its understanding of its competitors, rather than
an independent economic analysis focusing on consumers.68 The district
court held that evidence that the availability of first run films with Span-
ish dubbing or subtitles had fallen to “almost zero” in the relevant market
was sufficient evidence of harm to competition to survive summary
judgment.69
C. HARM TO COMPETITION
Howard v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC70 arose from an allegedly de-
fective refrigerator the plaintiff purchased from Lowe’s. The plaintiff al-
leged that the defective appliance caused personal injuries and a host of
damage to personal property.71 She brought suit alleging, among other
things, that Lowe’s had violated the Sherman Act by entering into an
agreement with Whirlpool described by the plaintiff as an “‘agreement
with the manufacturer to ignore the replacement requirements of all war-
ranty cases’” and as a “‘secret Agreement.’”72 The U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas gathered from the plaintiff’s deposition
testimony that she was referring to the Master Standard Buying Agree-
ment between Lowe’s and Whirlpool that governs the parties’ responsi-
bilities for harm to goods in shipment, invoicing, and warranties.73 Lowe’s
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim,
which the court granted because the plaintiff offered no evidence that the
Master Standard Buying Agreement or any other agreement between
Lowe’s and Whirlpool was anticompetitive.74
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION
Consumer protection developments in 2018 highlight the ever-growing
importance of choosing the right claims against the right parties. As is
often the case, 2018’s most significant developments arose under of the
TIC. The Texas Supreme Court made it clear that extra-contractual, bad-
faith denial claims and damages theoretically exist, but only to the dubi-
ous extent that the courts are willing to entertain them. Meanwhile, and
as predicted in last year’s article, federal courts across Texas are con-
fronting a new species of statutory-induced diversity that plaintiffs are
combating to mixed degrees of success. On the federal statutory front, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has now clarified that banks
68. Id. at *2 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 295, 325 (1962)).
69. Id.
70. 306 F. Supp. 3d 951 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
71. Id. at 954.
72. Id. at 954, 960.
73. Id. at 960.
74. Id.
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are not liable for loan-servicing companies’ unscrupulous practices, at
least not under principal/agent theories of vicarious liability.
These developments all share a common theme in that they reveal the
tension between old and new, between modern statutory schemes and
traditional common-law concepts.
A. STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
1. Menchaca and the Independent Injury Rule
The Texas Supreme Court issued a long-overdue opinion in 2018 clari-
fying a critical overlap between insurance policy contractual claims and
deceptive-practice claims under the TIC and at common law.75 In
Menchaca, a majority of the supreme court issued a well-reasoned, thor-
oughly researched, and overall helpful exposition on the blurred distinc-
tion between a claim for breach of an insurance policy (as a contract
action) and a purely statutory claim for deceptive insurance practices.76
Despite this helpful holding, the Menchaca court—or a plurality of it—
arguably misapplied the majority’s legal synthesis.
Menchaca involved USAA’s denial of coverage after a Galveston
homeowner filed a claim for damages caused by 2008’s Hurricane Ike.
Two adjusters determined that some of the storm’s damages were cov-
ered under the applicable policy, but they concluded that the repair costs
would fall below the homeowner’s deductible. Hence, USAA denied
coverage.77
The homeowner sued USAA for breach of contract and for first-party
insurance violations for bad-faith denial of coverage (or, more precisely,
for failure to adequately investigate before denying coverage). “As dam-
ages for both claims, [the homeowner] sought only insurance benefits
under the policy, plus court costs and attorney’s fees.”78 At trial, a jury
found that USAA did not breach the insurance policy by denying cover-
age. But the jury also found that USAA did commit a statutory violation
by “refus[ing] ‘to pay a claim without conducting a reasonable investiga-
tion with respect to’ that claim.”79 The jury awarded the homeowner
roughly $11,000 in damages. USAA sought judgement notwithstanding
verdict, contending the damage award conflicted with the first answer as a
matter of law.80 The homeowner countered that the damage award prop-
erly rested on the jury’s finding of a statutory violation.81
On appeal, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals affirmed,
essentially holding that the TIC “imposes a duty on an insurer, above and
75. USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 497 (Tex. 2018).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 485 n.1 (“The policy’s declaration page provides that the policy covers ‘only
that part of the loss over the deductible stated,’ and then lists the deductible amounts for
‘wind and hail’ and for ‘all other perils.’”).
78. Id. at 485.
79. Id. at 485–86.
80. Id. at 486.
81. Id.
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beyond the duties established by the insurance policy itself, to conduct a
reasonable investigation prior to denying a claim.”82 Thus, the intermedi-
ate court concluded, “[i]t follows that USAA could have fully complied
with the contract even if it failed to reasonably investigate [the home-
owner’s] claim.”83 The appellate arguments pitted two landmark Texas
Supreme Court decisions against each other. On the one hand, the su-
preme court had held that “an insurance company’s ‘failure to properly
investigate a claim is not a basis for obtaining policy benefits.’”84 On the
other hand, the supreme court had also held that “an insurer’s ‘unfair
refusal to pay the insured’s claim causes damages as a matter of law in at
least the amount of the policy benefits wrongfully withheld.’”85
Confronted with an opportunity to clarify the contradictory holdings,
the supreme court granted review and delved deep into the historical and
policy background underlying the distinction between a statutory breach
and a contractual breach, including the damage model available in each.86
The Menchaca court explained that a statutory violation (which sounds in
tort) and a policy breach (which sounds only in contract) are two wholly-
distinct causes of action based on different underlying duties to the in-
sured.87 Though distinct, such claims “are often ‘largely interwoven,’ and
the same evidence is often ‘admissible on both claims.’”88
In Menchaca, which presented an improbable jury verdict, the question
therefore was whether policy benefits may constitute “actual damages”
under the TIC. The Menchaca court noted that the answer, generally
speaking, is no—“but the issue is complicated and involves several re-
lated questions.”89 The Menchaca court then distilled decades of Texas
law on the issue into a laudably well-researched and pensive list of appli-
cable rules, as follows:
(1) General Rule: “[A]n insured cannot recover policy benefits for an
insurer’s statutory violation if the insured does not have a right to
those benefits under the policy. This rule derives from the fact that
the Insurance Code only allows an insured to recover actual dam-
ages ‘caused by’ the insurer’s statutory violation.”90
(2) Entitled-to-Benefits Rule: “[A]n insured who establishes a right to
receive benefits under an insurance policy can recover those bene-
fits as ‘actual damages’ under the statute if the insurer’s statutory
82. USAA Texas Lloyd’s Co. v. Menchaca, 13-13-00046-CV, 2014 WL 3804602, at *5
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 31, 2014) (discussing TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 541.060(a)(7)), rev’d, 14-0721, 2017 WL 1311752 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2017), opinion withdrawn
and superseded, 545 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2018) and rev’d, 545 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2018).
83. Id.
84. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castan˜eda, 988
S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1998)).
85. Id. (quoting Vail v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex.
1988)).
86. Id. at 486–503.
87. Id. at 489.
88. Id. (quoting Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1996)).
89. Id. at 489.
90. Id. at 490.
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violation causes the loss of the benefits. . . . Because the Insurance
Code provides that the statutory remedies are cumulative of other
remedies, we concluded that the insureds could elect to recover the
benefits under the statute even though they also could have as-
serted a breach-of-contract claim.”91
(3) Benefits-Lost Rule: “[A]n insured can recover benefits as actual
damages under the Insurance Code even if the insured has no right
to those benefits under the policy, if the insurer’s conduct caused
the insured to lose that contractual right.”92 The supreme court of-
fered several examples, including situations where an agent’s mis-
representations induced the insured to purchase a policy, only to
later learn that the claim type is not actually covered.93 Another
example would be a situation in which the insurer pays out other
claims during the course of litigation until the policy limit is
reached and obviates the otherwise triggered policy.94 The
Menchaca majority95 explained that, “[p]ut simply, an insurer that
commits a statutory violation that eliminates or reduces its contrac-
tual obligations cannot then avail itself of the general rule.”96
(4) Independent-Injury Rule: The Menchaca court reiterated the fa-
miliar notion that “there can be no claim for bad faith when an
insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered.”97
However, the Menchaca court noted that the Texas Supreme Court
had not foreclosed recovery where an insurer with no policy obliga-
tions nonetheless commits a statutory violation that entitles the
plaintiff to recover.98 The Menchaca court warned that such cases
“would be rare, and we in fact have yet to encounter one.”99
(5) No-Recovery Rule: “An insured cannot recover any damages
based on an insurer’s statutory violation unless the insured estab-
lishes a right to receive benefits under the policy or an injury inde-
pendent of a right to benefits.”100 This rule “is simply the natural
corollary to the first four rules.”101
The Menchaca court thus offered an invaluable roadmap for first-party
insurance litigants.
Of the five principles above set forth by Menchaca, the “benefits-lost
rule” is particularly noteworthy. The Menchaca facts actually bore some
91. Id. at 495 (noting that this result harmonizes Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual
Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1988)).
92. Id. at 497 (emphasis by court).
93. Id. at 497–98.
94. Id. at 498 (discussing Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 891–92 (Tex. 1985); JAW
The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 597, 599–602 (Tex. 2015)).
95. Id. A majority participated in the five-rule portion of the Menchaca holding. A
plurality participated in the application that resulted in the remand.
96. Id. at 499.
97. Id. (quoting Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 500.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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resemblance to those in the case the majority cited to as an example of
where the benefits-lost rule could have applied.102 The Menchaca major-
ity explained that JAW Pointe was a bad-faith insurance claim case where
the supreme court indicated, in dicta, that an insured’s statutory viola-
tions—payments to other insureds during litigation that resulted in ex-
haustion of the plaintiff’s policy limits—might support recovery of
contractual benefits. According to the Menchaca court, JAW Pointe’s in-
sured/plaintiff would have statutorily recovered policy benefits based on
the carrier’s depriving it of contractual rights through payments to other
insureds during litigation with the plaintiff (exhausting the policy lim-
its).103 During litigation the insurance carrier continued remitting pay-
ments to other policyholders until it hit the $25 million limit, at which
point the carrier moved for summary judgment on those grounds. The
plaintiff effectively ignored the summary judgment motion and instead
took its statutory recovery of benefits up on appeal, where it ultimately
lost based on an unrelated issue involving a policy exclusion. Though the
relevant portion of the JAW Pointe holding was either dicta or implied
(because of its unique posture on the unchallenged policy-limits argu-
ment), the Menchaca court highlighted the JAW Pointe facts as an exam-
ple of where statutory recovery might be decoupled from contractual
liability.104
What the Menchaca plurality did next as it applied those rules to its
facts is puzzling. The Menchaca court acknowledged that it must find a
way, any way, to harmonize allegedly conflicting jury answers, “if reason-
ably possible,” to avoid a remand.105 Thus, based on the appellate record
and applicable standards for reviewing a jury charge, all the Menchaca
court needed to do was find some way to square the jury’s verdict with
one of the enumerated exceptions.
Menchaca’s plurality probably could have done so by applying the ben-
efits-lost rule—i.e., interpreting the jury’s finding to be that, while USAA
did not breach the policy/contract because the deductible was not
reached, a statutorily prohibited failure to fully investigate caused the
damages to fall short of that deductible. The application might have been
a bit awkward, but it would have fit the facts better than the chosen out-
come. First, application of the benefits-lost rule would have negated any
alleged conflict in the verdict. It also would have also afforded a much
smoother disposition of the case than a tortured remand on an issue that
the Menchaca court expressly noted was not properly preserved for ap-
peal but that it considered anyway “[i]n the interest of justice.”106
102. See id. at 498–99 (discussing JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460
S.W.3d 597, 609 (Tex. 2015)).
103. Id. (“We accepted this argument[.]”).
104. Id. (“Put simply, an insurer that commits a statutory violation that eliminates or
reduces its contractual obligations cannot then avail itself of the general rule [whereby
contractual liability is a prerequisite to recovery under statutory claims].”).
105. Id. at 509.
106. Id. at 520.
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Again, disposition under the benefits-lost rule would have been less-
than-ideal, but still better than the procedural contortion that actually did
follow.107 Menchaca’s relevant facts actually coincided somewhat with the
facts the court pointed out in JAW Pointe. According to the Menchaca
court’s own analysis, JAW Pointe’s plaintiffs lacked a contractual claim
(even if hypothetically, as dicta) due to the insured’s statutorily wrongful
triggering of the policy’s ceiling; the Menchaca plaintiff likewise lacked a
contractual claim due to USAA’s statutorily wrongful triggering of the
policy’s floor. The parallels are compelling.
Perhaps quibbling over this arguably incorrect result, at least for pur-
poses of this article, amounts to nothing more than hair-splitting in the
face of an otherwise helpful holding that added some clarity to a murky
area of Texas insurance law. Indeed, one intermediate court of appeals
later cited Menchaca and declared that, in Texas, “[t]he independent in-
jury rule is alive and well.”108 But is that really the takeaway from
Menchaca?
On the one hand, it is probably not. On its face, Menchaca enumerated
exceptions to the rule. Clearly, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged
that statutory recovery may lie even in the absence of a contractual
breach—at least in the abstract or by dusting off its own earlier dicta.
On the other hand, maybe it is. While the supreme court recognized a
perhaps narrow exception to the rule, it nevertheless failed to apply it
despite having decent facts to do so. For practitioners, perhaps this is the
more telling aspect of Menchaca. An exception only exists to the extent
that Texas courts are willing to apply it.
2. Federal Courts Grapple With New Diversity Statute Practice
As the authors’ 2017 article predicted, 2018 saw the defense bar take
advantage of a new Texas law that makes more lawsuits under the TIC
potentially removable to federal court.109 This new provision, TIC Sec-
tion 542A.006, became effective in September 2017. The authors’ 2017
article noted that the law “affords insurance carriers that are sued for
allegedly deceptive insurance practices . . . an option to assume agents’
(including adjusters) liability as their own.”110 Dismissing adjusters and
other insurance agents from the case often creates complete diversity.
This is good for defendants, of course, because federal procedure permits
an early-stage dispositive motion practice that is either riskier or unavail-
107. The Menchaca court ultimately deviated from the TIC and the independent injury
rule and veered into the realm of appellate procedure, including fundamental error and
appellate preservation. It ultimately decided to remand in favor of USAA despite USAA’s
failure to preserve those same grounds.
108. Turner v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 07-17-00279-CV, 2018 WL 2709489, at *4
(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 5, 2018, no pet.).
109. Leslie Sara Hyman & Matthew J. McGown, Consumer Protection, 4 SMU ANN.
TEX. SURV. 127, 129–30 (2018) (discussing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542A.006).
110. Id. at 129.
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able in state courts.111
Although the legislative changes appear to have been somewhat effec-
tive in creating diversity in some 2018 cases,112 plaintiffs have used long-
111. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (granting defendants a relatively consequence-
free option to seek dismissal for failure to state a claim), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7 (“[T]he
court must award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and reasonable and necessary
attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged cause of action in the trial court.”).
Once again in 2018, research conducted for this article revealed no shortage of instances
where Texas federal courts were not shy about early dismissals of consumer protection
fraud lawsuits. See Thornton v. Ditech Fin. LLC, No. 2:18-CV-156, 2018 WL 4408979, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2018); Carroll v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 4:18-CV-458-A,
2018 WL 4100939, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2018) (mem. op.); Ford v. Fitness Int’l, LLC,
No. 3:17-CV-1460-L-BT, 2018 WL 4376415, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-1460-L, 2018 WL 4362606 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13,
2018); Murillo v. Allstate Vehicle, No. 7:18-CV-208, 2018 WL 3862108, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 13, 2018) (“For the foregoing reasons Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal for
Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims under the TIC and the DTPA is warranted.”); Guey
Ming Yeh v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Indiana, No. 4:18-CV-00026, 2018 WL 1858151, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 18, 2018) (mem. op.); Caruth v. Chubb Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Texas, No. 3:17-CV-
2748-G, 2018 WL 1729136, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2018) (mem. op.) (“But because
‘[t]he DTPA claim is derivative of the Texas Insurance Code Claims,’ and the court has
already concluded that the Caruths have not adequately pleaded a cause of action under
the Texas Insurance Code, any claim against Morgan under the DTPA must fail.”); Brad-
ford v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:17-CV-1067-RP, 2018 WL 2452971, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. May 31, 2018) (granting leave to amend); Univ. Baptist Church Fort Worth v. Lexing-
ton Ins. Co., No. 4:17-CV-962-A, 2018 WL 2372645, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2018) (mem.
op.); Dickey v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., No. CV H-18-770, 2018 WL 2454159, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. May 10, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:18-CV-770, 2018 WL
2441647 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2018) (mem. op.); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Loew,
No. A-17-CV-119-LY, 2018 WL 2085212, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2018) (“Loew has
failed to adequately plead violations of the Texas Insurance Code and TDTPA by Otis and
Gomez.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. A-17-CV-119-LY, 2018 WL 3603101
(W.D. Tex. May 16, 2018); Click v. State Farm Lloyds, 1:17-CV-00108-BL, 2018 WL
1322167, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2018) (mem. op.); TEU Servs., Inc. v. Inventronics
USA, Inc., No. SA-16-CV-01023-RCL, 2018 WL 3338217, at *7–8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2018)
(mem. op.); Univ. Baptist Church v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 4:17-CV-962-A, 2018 WL
580633, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018) (mem. op.); Ada Noles Props., LLC v. CitiMort-
gage, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-1241-K (BF), 2018 WL 889451, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-1241-K, 2018 WL 837697 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 13, 2018). This is not to say that state court dispositive motion practice is unheard of
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. See, e.g., Marshall v. Enter. Bank, 10-16-00379-
CV, 2018 WL 4224078, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Ac-
cordingly, based on the foregoing, we cannot say that appellants were consumers within
the ambit of the DTPA.”).
112. See, e.g., Yan Qing Jiang v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 1:18-CV-758-RP,
2018 WL 6201954, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2018) (“In its response to Jiang’s motion to
remand, Travelers provides written notice to Jiang that it elects to accept responsibility for
her claims against Pustka. The [c]ourt must therefore dismiss all of Jiang’s claims against
Pustka relating to Jiang’s insurance claim. Because all of Jiang’s claims against Pustka re-
late to her insurance claim, the [c]ourt must dismiss all of Jiang’s claims against Pustka with
prejudice.”); Electro Grafix, Corp. v. Acadia Ins. Co., No. SA-18-CA-589-XR, 2018 WL
3865416, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2018) (“Given that any claim that [p]laintiff makes
against Odermatt will be dismissed under § 542A.006(c), the [c]ourt finds that Acadia has
met its burden to show that there is no reasonable basis to predict that [p]laintiff might be
able to recover against [d]efendant Odermatt.”). But see Vasquez v. State Farm Lloyds, No.
SA-17-CV-01080-DAE, 2018 WL 1899808, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 5:17-CV-1080-DAE, 2018 WL 1905112 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2018) (“State Farm conceded at the hearing that this amendment, which took effect the day
after this lawsuit was filed, does not apply to this case. Further, that the Texas Legislature
passed this amendment is evidence that it construed the pre-amendment version of the
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standing diversity-defeating principles to combat the new provision,
which has led to some pitched developments and even some apparent
disagreement amongst Texas federal courts. The following is a chronolog-
ical discussion of the case law under TIC Section 542A.006.
In Massey, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held that removal was improper based on the traditional notion
that “an action nonremovable when commenced may become removable
thereafter only by the voluntary act of the plaintiff.”113 The Massey case
landed in federal court on a motion to remand exactly as one would ex-
pect under the new TIC provision. The plaintiffs’ Houston-area home
sustained damage during Hurricane Harvey.114 The homeowners sued
Allstate in state court after the carrier denied coverage.115 The homeown-
ers also named four Texas-resident insurance adjusters, whose liability
Allstate elected to assume under the new provisions of TIC Section
542A.006. The district court dismissed the individual adjusters and left
only Allstate as a defending party.116 Allstate removed to federal court,
at which point the homeowners filed a motion to remand asserting that
diversity may not ordinarily be created based on acts taken exclusively by
the defendant.117 As the district court explained, this so-called “volun-
tary-involuntary rule” provides that “an action nonremovable when com-
menced may become removable thereafter only by the voluntary act of
the plaintiff.”118 One well-known exception to the rule permits removal
where a plaintiff fraudulently joined the diversity-defeating defendant.119
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit added another exception
in Crockett, where it held that removal may be proper following the state
court’s dismissal of improperly joined (not just fraudulently joined)
parties.120
Invoking Crockett and citing a purportedly analogous 2006 case from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,121 Allstate
urged the trial court to essentially carve out another exception to the vol-
Texas Insurance Code (the version that applies in this case) to permit liability to be im-
posed on adjusters.”).
113. Massey v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., CV H-18-1144, 2018 WL 3017431, at
*2 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2018 no pet.) (mem. op.) (Judge Gray Miller, adopting recommenda-
tion by Magistrate Judge Nancy Johnson) (quoting Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006); Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 547 (5th
Cir. 1967)).




118. Id. at *2 (quoting Crockett, 436 F.3d at 532; Weems, 380 F.2d at 547); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2011) (addressing diversity jurisdiction and removal).
119. See Weems, 380 F.2d at 547.
120. Crockett, 436 F.3d at 533 (holding that the voluntary-involuntary rule “is designed
to prevent plaintiffs from blocking removal by joining nondiverse and/or in-state defend-
ants who should not be parties. That salutary purpose is also served by recognizing an
exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule where defendants are improperly, though not
fraudulently, joined[.]”).
121. See Zea v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 603, 606–07 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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untary-involuntary rule applicable to defendants’ acceptance of agents’
liability under TIC Section 542A.006.122 Allstate premised its argument
on what the trial court framed as a merits-based test for application of the
voluntary-involuntary rule, one where a case is nonetheless removable
following dismissal so long as the dismissal was not based on the mer-
its.123 The district court rejected Allstate’s argument and held that the
merits-versus-non-merits distinction is irrelevant.124 Instead, the Massey
court reasoned, the Fifth Circuit has only handed down just the one ex-
ception applicable under just the one test—did “the plaintiff fraudulently
or improperly joined the non-diverse defendant”?125 Noting that Allstate
at no pointed contended that the adjusters’ joinder was proper, the Mas-
sey court concluded the issue by holding that “Allstate could not remove
the case based on the state court’s dismissal of the adjusters as that dis-
missal was involuntary to the Masseys.”126
The Massey court’s reasoning and interpretation of the applicable Fifth
Circuit case law were sound, so for a period afterward it seemed safe to
assume that removal based on TIC Section 542A.006 was improper in the
Fifth Circuit.
But then, about two months later, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas issued its holding in Electro Grafix, where
removal was deemed proper because a TIC Section 542A.006 election
carries the removal proponent’s burden to show that the plaintiff has “no
reasonable basis to predict that [p]laintiff might be able to recover against
[the dismissed adjuster].”127 The Electro Grafix court noted that, upon a
defendant’s written notice that it has elected to accept agents’ liability,
the TIC gives courts no choice but to dismiss those defendants with
prejudice.128 Thus, reasoned Judge Xavier Rodriguez in the Electro
Grafix decision, a removing defendant has met its burden to establish
(under the improper joinder test) that “there is no reasonable basis to
predict that [p]laintiff might be able to recover against” the dismissed
agent.129 The Electro Grafix court did not cite to, allude to, or otherwise
address the somewhat contrary holding in Massey.
Then, two months after Electro Grafix, Allstate employed the lessons
learned from the Massey holding and took a different and—this time—
successful, new approach against remand by arguing to Judge Rodriguez
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas that an agent
being a named defendant is itself an improper joinder following a TIC
122. Massey, 2018 WL 3017431, at *2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Electro Grafix, Corp. v. Acadia Ins. Co., No. SA-18-CA-589-XR, 2018 WL
3865416, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2018).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Section 542A.006 election.130 Unlike its concession in Massey that the
joinder was proper,131 in Flores, Allstate maintained from the very begin-
ning and throughout the removal/remand proceedings that the joinder of
an adjuster was improper the moment the plaintiff received Allstate’s
election notice.132 Allstate’s new approach convinced Judge Rodriguez,
who relied on the Electro Grafix holding to reiterate that:
even when a plaintiff asserts viable claims against an insurance agent,
an election of liability by the insurer for the agent’s acts or omissions
is sufficient to show improper joinder on the basis that there is no
reasonable basis to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover
against the agent.133
Judge Rodriguez went even further and held that the thirty-day removal
clock may begin to run at the time of the state court’s dismissal based on
TIC Section 542A.006, which the court held “is tantamount to a finding
of improper joinder.”134
Judge Rodriguez’s holdings in Electro Grafix and Flores appear super-
ficially reconcilable with Judge Miller’s holding in Massey, but arguably a
district split is brewing amongst Texas federal courts. Although Massey
did not present the Southern District with an opportunity to weigh
whether joinder of an agent is inherently improper upon an insurer’s no-
tice of assuming agents’ liability, the tone and tenor of Judge Miller’s
holding reveals skepticism in the Southern District about TIC Section
542A.006’s ability to circumvent the voluntary-involuntary rule. Judge
Rodriguez, on the other hand, appears inclined to find diversity jurisdic-
tion even when removal occurs under the lenient deadlines of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446, which indicates that the Western District is more likely to find
that it has diversity jurisdiction despite TIC Section 542A.006.
In January 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, in Stephens, took a stance more akin to Massey than Electro
Grafix/Flores and held that TIC Section 542A.006 election establishes im-
proper joinder only if the insurer serves notice of its election prior to the
commencement of the state court action.135 The Stephens court concluded
that “[t]he timing of an insurer’s election is critical to a court’s improper
joinder inquiry” after a detailed analysis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rule mandating that courts focus on the facts and posture
130. Flores v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., No. SA-18-CV-742-XR, 2018 WL
5695553, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018).
131. Allstate actually had no choice in Massey but to concede that joinder was initially
proper on the face of the pleadings because otherwise its removal would have been un-
timely. Massey, 2018 WL 3017431 at *3–4 (noting that, although a case generally is remova-
ble within 30 days of service of the pleadings, removal is also proper within 30 days of
service of an amended pleading or other paper—like a court order—if the later paper is
what permits a defendant to ascertain diversity jurisdiction) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1)).
132. Flores, 2018 WL 5695553, at *5.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Stephens v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind., No. 4:18-CV-00595, 2019 WL 109395, at *6
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem. op.) (Judge Amos Mazzant).
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at the time of the joinder, not the foreseeable futility of the joinder fol-
lowing the post-lawsuit election of liability under TIC Section
542A.006.136 Specifically, the Stephens court rejected the defendant’s em-
phasis on the “‘possibility of recovery’” because it confused the odds of
recovery with the propriety of the joinder itself.137 The Stephens court
generally agreed with Massey’s remand because the election occurred af-
ter the case commenced.138 The Stephens court also agreed with Electro
Grafix’s remand result because the defendant there had served its TIC
election notice prior to the case’s commencement.139 The Stephens court
stopped just short of outright rejecting Flores.140
Obviously, TIC Section 542A.006’s enactment has stirred much debate
and left many questions unanswered as its interplay with the voluntary-
involuntary rule works its way to the Fifth Circuit. Practitioners should
take heed of Stephens, which is the most recent holding and the latest
word on the issue. Stephens advises that counsel should act swiftly in
making their election under the new statute. While requiring pre-suit
election perhaps seems a bit draconian, the Stephens court observed a
valid point regarding the Fifth Circuit’s improper-joinder rule requiring
emphasis on a procedural snapshot in time rather than the wisdom of
naming the party. Whether the Fifth Circuit agrees is anybody’s guess,
but for now, the safe play is the earliest possible assumption of agents’
liability.
B. FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION: REAL ESTATE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a holding in 2018
that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), a federal stat-
utory scheme aimed at protecting consumers from predatory mortgage-
collection practices, does not permit allegedly defrauded mortgagors to
bring claims against the banks, as opposed to the loan servicing company,
under a principal-agent theory of liability.141
The Christiana Trust plaintiff brought claims against the company that
serviced her loan (Ocwen) through Bank of America (BOA) and also
against the bank itself, alleging that BOA stood vicariously liable for the
136. Id. at *5–7 (discussing, inter alia, Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568
(5th Cir. 2004)).
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *6.
139. Id. at *7.
140. Id. at *6. (“Flores’ reliance on Electro Grafix, however, is misplaced because the
diverse defendant-insurer in Electro Grafix made the election before the plaintiff-insured
commenced action in state court. The timing of an insurer’s election is critical to a court’s
improper joinder inquiry. That is, whether an insurer’s election to accept full liability of an
adjuster is tantamount to a finding of improper joinder turns on if it was made prior to or
after the state court action was commenced.”).
141. Christiana Trust v. Riddle, 911 F.3d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2018); see also 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601–2617.
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unlawful practices of its agent, Ocwen.142 The U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims against BOA because (in
addition to pleading deficiencies), “[b]y its plain terms, the regulation at
issue here imposes duties only on servicers.”143 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
based on a reconciliatory reading of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) rules and applicable underlying statute.144 The appellate
panel reasoned that Congress drafted RESPA such that its various
prohibitions expressly apply only to a “servicer,” which is defined as “‘the
person responsible’ for” servicing of a loan (including the person who
makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).145 The pro-
scriptive language in RESPA provides that “a servicer of a federally re-
lated mortgage shall not . . . fail to comply with any other obligation
found by the [CFPB].”146 Noting that the CFPB mirrored congressional
language in the rule—i.e., “a servicer shall”147—the Christiana Trust
court held that “the regulation at issue here imposes duties only on ser-
vicers.”148 The statute also provides that “[w]hoever fails to comply with
any provision of this section shall be liable to the borrower for each such
failure.”149 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “because only ‘servicers’ can
‘fail to comply’ . . . only servicers can be ‘liable to the borrower’ for those
failures.”150 According to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he text squarely settles the
issue.”151
The Fifth Circuit noted at the outset that it appeared to be the first
federal appellate court, and the first court within the Fifth Circuit, to ad-
dress the vicarious-liability issue.152 Most other district courts to address
the issue reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit.153 The Christi-
ana Trust panel expressly rejected the approach taken by the District
Court of New Hampshire in Rouleau, which in 2015 held that a RESPA
claims is “‘a species of tort liability’” and that therefore Congress drafted
RESPA “against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious lia-
bility rules.”154 The Fifth Circuit explained its disagreement with Rouleau
142. Christiana Trust, 911 F.3d at 802. Specifically, RESPA—pursuant to rulemaking by
the CFPB—requires lender-side entities to provide homeowners with the various options
available to prevent foreclosure. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(1); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(k)(1)(E) (conferring rulemaking authority).
143. Christiana Trust, 911 F.3d at 804; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
144. Christiana Trust, 911 F.3d at 804.
145. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2)).
146. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E)) (emphasis and omission added by court).
147. Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(1)).
148. Id. (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)).
150. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(k)(1)(E), 2605(f)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 805 (discussing Hawk v. Carrington Mortg. Services, LLC, 3:14-CV-1044,
2016 WL 4433665, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2016) (mem. op.); Green v. Cent. Mortg. Co.,
148 F. Supp. 3d 852, 876–77 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Bennett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, CA 15-
00165-KD-C, 2015 WL 5294321, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015); McAndrew v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (M.D. Pa. 2013)).
154. Id. (discussing Rouleau v. US Bank, NA, No. 14-CV-568-JL, 2015 WL 1757104, *7
(D.N.H. Apr. 17, 2015) (mem. op.)).
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as follows:
We decline to adopt Rouleau’s reasoning because it falls short even
on its own terms. Congress did express an intent contrary to the in-
corporation of traditional vicarious liability rules. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)
defines the parameters of § 2605 liability: “[w]hoever fails to comply
with any provision of this section” is liable. This legislatively pre-
scribed definition—which makes parties responsible solely for their
own failures to comply—fundamentally conflicts with traditional vi-
cariously liability, which imputes liability “based on the tortious acts
of another.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 13 (2000) (emphasis ad-
ded). Congress could have imposed § 2605 liability on “whoever fails
to comply or whoever has hired an agent who fails to comply.” It
could have imposed liability on “whoever would be liable under
traditional principles of tort law.” It could have said nothing at all,
perhaps leaving the common law as a gap filler. It could have im-
posed the statutory duty to ensure compliance with the CFPB’s regu-
lations not only on loan servicers, but also on lenders. But Congress
did none of those things.155
The Christiana Trust panel probably reached the correct result, but it
did so through somewhat anemic reasoning. While lawmakers and the
CFPB arguably intended the applicable provisions to apply only to ser-
vicers (not lender banks), drafters did not write such intent into the stat-
ute/rule “plainly and unambiguously.”156 The Christiana Trust court itself
cited general notions that the drafters’ use of one word (e.g., a servicer)
instead of others (e.g., a person) speaks volumes about legislative in-
tent.157 This argument both supports and cuts against the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning. If Congress intended RESPA liability to apply only to “ser-
vicer[s],” why did it neglect to draft that same language into the portion
of the statute that answered the “ultimate question of [RESPA] liabil-
ity”? Instead of providing that consumers have a cause of action against
“servicers” (which would be consistent with the drafting of the substan-
tive liability statutes), the statute instead provides that consumers may
recover from “whoever” violates RESPA. Again, the Fifth Circuit proba-
bly reached the right decision, but its analysis on the statutory construc-
tion contains holes, and the statute, perhaps, is less “plain and
unambiguous” than the Fifth Circuit suggested.
Christiana Trust is also problematic from a broader perspective—
namely, it might have muddied the water regarding the interplay between
statutory claims and common-law background principles. The notion that
lawmakers’ used the term “whoever” to mean only those who actually
violate the section is questionable because it suggests that common-law
principles do not apply to statutory torts unless lawmakers specifically
155. Id. at 805–06.
156. But see id. at 806.
157. Id. at 805 (“‘When Congress includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another,’ we ‘presume[ ] that Congress intended a difference in mean-
ing.’”) (quoting Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018); Loughrin v.
United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014)).
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incorporate those principles.158 While the Fifth Circuit correctly stated
that common-law principles may be read into RESPA if Congress had
said “nothing at all,” it also indicated that preservation of the common
law would require affirmative statutory language.159 The Fifth Circuit ar-
guably inverted the United States Supreme Court’s standard, which in-
structs courts to read common law principles into a statute unless
specifically instructed by Congress not to.160 Indeed, “[t]he difference
matters.”161
IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust and consumer protection developments in 2018 teach us that
this legal sector continues to favor defendants. In the antitrust context,
only a diligent few plaintiffs survive even early-stage dismissal on the
pleadings. In the consumer protection realm, courts appear as willing as
ever to whittle away common-law principles traditionally available to
plaintiffs.
158. See id. at 806.
159. See id. (“Congress could have imposed § 2605 liability on ‘whoever fails to comply
or whoever has hired an agent who fails to comply.’ It could have imposed liability on
‘whoever would be liable under traditional principles of tort law.’ It could have said noth-
ing at all[.]”). There is a good argument to be made that—in light of the flawed statutory
construction explained—Congress did, in fact, say “nothing at all” on the issue when it
drafted RESPA.
160. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290–91 (2003) (“We believe that courts
ordinarily should determine that matter in accordance with traditional principles of vicari-
ous liability—unless, of course, Congress, better able than courts to weigh the relevant
policy considerations, has instructed the courts differently.”). In addition to the Fair Hous-
ing Act discussed in Meyer, other statutory schemes have been construed in light of com-
mon law principles. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1993) (holding that
debt-collection statute did not abrogate common-law availability of prejudgment interest
because “[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’
to the question addressed by the common law”). One ready example is statutory real estate
fraud, which borrows from centuries of common law. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01(b) (“A person who makes a false representation or false promise commits
the fraud described in Subsection (a) of this section and is liable to the person defrauded
for actual damages.”). But see III Forks Real Estate, L.P. v. Cohen, 228 S.W.3d 810, 814
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (“A principal is liable for the fraudulent acts and misrep-
resentations of its authorized agent, even though the principal had no knowledge of the
fraud and did not consent to it, whether or not the principal derives a benefit from it.”);
Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (“[W]e think
‘actual damages’ in the statutory-fraud context should receive the same treatment as ‘ac-
tual damages’ in the common-law fraud context.”).
161. See Christiana Trust, 911 F.3d at 805.
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